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Abstract: This article reviews a recently decided United States Supreme Court case 
which held that a thirty-two month moratorium on development did not constitute a 
taking per se.  The Court, building on logic from other recent decisions, found that 
moratoria are an effective land use tool, which prevent inefficient land development and 
consequently lead to increased land value.   This article analyzes the court’s decision to 
hold that moratoria are never takings per se, instead holding that a court shall perform 




 A recent U.S. Supreme Court case upheld a 32 month moratorium on 
development  and resolved questions regarding regulatory takings that have been 
vigorously debated for years.  In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, [535 U.S. ___ (2002)] the court answered questions that 
had been raised but not resolved as recently as last year in the case of Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island [121 S.Ct. 2448 (2001)].  First, some background. 
 
Local governments are often discouraged from acting to protect the environment 
because they are concerned that their regulations may go too far and constitute a 
regulatory taking.  As early as 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court held “that while property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking.” [Pennsylvania Coal Co. V. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)] Occasionally, courts 
find that a regulation adopted to protect the public interest is so burdensome that it 
effectively takes title to the land.  The constitutions of the United States and each of the 
50 states allow local governments to appropriate private land interests for public 
purposes but require that they compensate the affected owners by paying them the 
market value of the land interest taken. [N.Y. Const. Art. I, § 7]  Particularly onerous 
regulations have, from time to time, been called regulatory takings, forcing the regulator 
to pay just compensation for the values taken during the time the regulation remains in 
effect.   
 
The doctrine of regulatory takings limits governmental authority that is otherwise 
extremely broad in scope. Local land use and environmental regulations, in fact, enjoy 
several legal preferences.  They are presumed to be constitutional.  Those who 
challenge them are said to have a particularly heavy burden of proof that the regulation 
is arbitrary or capricious, a tough burden to carry.  The courts use a rational basis test to 
measure local laws affecting land use saying that any rational basis justifying the 
adoption of the law is sufficient to overcome a claim that it is arbitrary. Local land use 
and environmental laws are legislative acts.  Normally, judges defer to legislative 
judgments and do not heavily scrutinize legislative acts.  When local laws leave no 
viable economic use, when they are not justified by legitimate public interests, or when 
they violate fundamental property rights, such as the right to exclude the public from the 
owner’s possession, these laws risk being invalidated as regulatory takings and causing 
the regulator to pay just compensation. 
 
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, [121 S.Ct. 2448 (2001)] the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that a landowner is not precluded from attacking a regulation that was in place 
when he acquired title to the land. Palazzolo owned a 20 acre parcel, most of which was 
salt marsh subject to tidal flooding.  Development would have required significant fill, up 
to six feet in some places, to support any development.  Under the Rhode Island coastal 
wetland regulations, development on the tidal wetlands portion of this site was 
prohibited unless the owner secured a special exception permit for an activity that 
serves a compelling public purpose which benefits the public as a whole.  The 
responsible state agency denied Palazzolo’s application to fill 11 of 18 tidal wetland 
acres for a private beach club. Palazzolo had acquired title to the coastal property after 
the tidal wetlands regulations had been adopted.  Under case law in some states, this 
fact would preclude a landowner from challenging the preexisting regulation as a taking. 
In Gazza v. DEC, for example, the New York Court of Appeals held that “a promulgated 
regulation forms part of the title to property as a preexisting rule of state law” precluding 
the owner from raising a takings challenge against that rule. [89 NY 603 (1997)] 
 
A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Palazzolo could not agree on whether 
the existence of a regulation at the time of purchase should be considered in 
determining whether the regulation interferes with the purchaser’s investment-backed 
expectations, one of several factors used to determine if a taking has occurred.  Without 
guidance on that issue, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Rhode Island 
courts for a determination as to whether a taking had in fact occurred.  
 
The U. S. Supreme Court also refused to consider Palazzolo’s claim that the 
relevant parcel to use in a takings case is the land affected by the regulation, in this 
case the 18 wetland acres in his 20 acre parcel.  The majority decision recognized that 
determining the parcel of land that should be considered when a takings claim is raised 
is the “persisting question of what is the proper denominator in the takings fraction.”  
Since this issue was not presented in the petition for certiorari to the Court, the majority 
refused to consider it.  
 
The questions left open by the Palazzolo case were addressed in 2002 in the 
case of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 
[535 U.S. ___ (2002)] In Tahoe, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a moratorium on all 
development lasting 32 months was not, by itself, a taking.  At issue in the Tahoe case 
was the validity of a moratorium on development adopted by the Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency to protect the unique environment and tourist-based economy of the 
Tahoe region.  The Agency was created by a novel compact between the legislatures of 
California and Nevada.  The compact gave land use authority over development in the 
region to the Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.  This area had previously been 
regulated by agencies of two states, five counties and several municipalities, as well as 
the Forest Service of the Federal Government.  The objective of the regional agency 
was to coordinate and regulate development in the Lake Tahoe Basin and to conserve 
its natural resources. 
 
 In creating the Agency, the legislatures of the two states were motivated by the 
treat posed by development to the clarity of Lake Tahoe which had begun to cloud as 
early as the late 1950s.  The culprit was locating development in the wrong place, 
particularly in the steeper drainage areas near streams and wetlands.  These resources 
act as filters for much of the nitrogen, phosphorous, and other pollution that water runoff 
carries.   By 1980, it was obvious that the initial land use regulations adopted by the 
Agency had failed.  After the withdrawal of support by the State of California, the 
Agency’s structure was redefined by amendments to the compact law in that year.  The 
Agency was directed by the two states to develop environmental threshold carrying 
capacities including standards for air quality, water quality, soil conservation, vegetation 
preservation, and noise.  This new legislation halted temporarily all development in 
critical environmental areas in region, giving the Agency the time it required to consider, 
draft, adopt, and implement needed new regulations.  That moratorium lasted for 32 
months. 
 
 The legal challenge to this moratorium was launched by a nonprofit corporation 
representing 400 owners of land in the critical environmental areas of the Basin who 
had purchased their parcels prior to the 1980 changes in the compact legislation.  They 
claimed that the moratorium on the development of their properties was a regulatory 
taking.  Their essential argument was that, even though the regulation does not take the 
future right to develop, the temporary taking of all development rights, for the 32 month 
period, itself violates the constitution.  
 
The owners’ argument raised an issue that had been hotly debated for years.  
Are property rights in a single parcel of land severable for the purpose of takings law?  If 
property rights are defined in segments and one of those segments, such as the present 
right to develop, it totally prohibited by a regulation, does that regulation constitute a 
total taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council [505 U.S. 1003 (1992)]?  If 
property rights are to be segmented in this way for takings analysis, then it would be 
possible to argue that regulations that prohibit use of a portion of the physical property, 
as in the Palazzolo case,  or that limit the functional enjoyment of the property – the 
extent to which the owner can use the land – might constitute takings as well.  
 
Broadly stated, the question was whether a regulation that totally limits the use a 
portion of the land, whether limited by time, use, or space, deprives its owner of all 
economically beneficial use under the constitution. Specifically, the legal question 
addressed by the Tahoe case was whether a moratorium on development of land 
constituted a regulatory taking, per se, that is, without any further inquiry into the 
circumstances.  The landowners argued for a categorical rule which would classify a 
development moratorium as a taking without considering the moratorium’s length, the 
severity of the problems addressed, the good faith of the agency involved, or what it did 
to conduct the required studies, analyze the underlying problems, and draft appropriate 
new regulations.  
  
 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments and refused to declare 
that a moratorium is a categorical taking, regardless of the circumstances. In arriving at 
this conclusion, the Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that property interests 
should be segmented, in time, use, or function, for the purpose of determining whether 
the interests have been taken.  The decision resolved the long standing debate on this 
matter, affirming the ‘parcel as a whole rule’ adopted by the Court in Penn Central v. 
City of New York. [438 U.S. 104 (1978)]   “Logically, ‘ the Court noted, “a fee simple 
estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, 
because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”  
 
The Tahoe court held that a moratorium, like most other land use regulations, is 
subject to an ad hoc inquiry that considers the circumstances of the case such as the 
character of the regulation, the public interest to be achieved, the extent to which it 
interferes with the owner’s investment-backed expectations, and how severely they are 
affected by the regulation.  In other words, a moratorium may be a taking, under the 
circumstances of a particular case, but is not categorically so.  In the Tahoe case, the 
Court noted that the lower federal courts had concluded that the 32 month period was 
not unreasonable and that the Agency had acted in good faith during that time to do 
what needed to be done before the moratorium could be lifted. It further recognized that 
the consensus of land use planners is that moratoria are an essential tool of successful 
development.   
 
Moratoria prevent landowners from rushing to develop, causing inefficient and ill-
conceived growth before a comprehensive plan can be adopted.  They prevent 
regulators from making hasty decisions which would disadvantage landowners as well 
as the public. The Court recognized that land values can actually increase during a 
moratorium and that the public and all landowners are reciprocally benefited by 
moratoria because they protect everyone’s interest against immediate construction that 
might be inconsistent with the provisions of the plan that is ultimately adopted.  Of 
course, moratoria can be enacted that are not reasonable in these ways and they are 
vulnerable, under Tahoe, to challenge. 
 
The Tahoe case did not squarely raise the issue of whether the fact that a 
landowner takes title to property after a regulation is adopted is relevant to that owner’s 
taking claim. Justice Scalia stated in Palazzolo that “the fact that a restriction existed at 
the time the purchaser took title … should have no bearing upon the determination of 
whether the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a taking.” In her concurring 
opinion, Justice O’Connor noted that “Today’s holding does not mean that the timing of 
the regulation’s enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial….”  She cited 
Penn Central for the proposition that several factors are considered in determining 
whether a regulation constitutes a taking, including whether it interferes with the 
landowner’s legitimate investment-backed expectations. She noted that “the regulatory 
regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape 
the reasonableness of those expectations.”   
 
In Tahoe, the majority decision quotes O’Connor’s statement on this matter in full 
and calls her comments “instructive.”  It appears likely that, in future cases, the court will 
consider as instrumental the fact that an owner has purchased land after a regulation is 
adopted in determining whether the owner’s investment-backed expectations are 
violated. 
